When baker Joseph Lochner was fined $50 for violating the
law, he challenged in court as a violation of his constitutional rights. The
Supreme Court’s ruling for him in Lochner v. New York (1905)
gave its name to an era when the court revered private property rights and enshrined
a one-sided view of freedom of contract over the interests of workers,
consumers, and the disadvantaged.
The standard narrative of Supreme Court history treats
the Lochner Era as something of a blip, an exception to the court’s historic
role of expanding and protecting legal rights of workers, minorities, and
criminal defendants. But, as legal journalist Ian Millhiser points out in his
newly published book Injustices (Nation Books), that view of
Supreme Court triumphalism overlooks a long list of discreditable decisions
from the court through most of its history. (Disclosure:
Millhiser and I are friendly colleagues.)
The court protected slaveholders before the Civil War and
industrialists after. It gutted the post-Civil War civil rights laws passed by
Congress, killing the Reconstruction in utero and midwifing
instead the Jim Crow era of racial segregation. It stunted the growth of unions
and dramatically sided with railroad barons in violently putting down the Pullman strike in 1895. And it stood on the sidelines in
the face of egregious violations of the Bill of Rights in state and local
criminal justice systems.
Thus, Millhiser’s subtitle: “The Supreme Court’s History
of Comforting the Comfortable and Afflicting the Afflicted.” In his summarizing
J’accuse, Millhiser writes: “Few institutions have inflicted
greater suffering on more Americans than the Supreme Court of the United States.”
To his credit, Millhiser tells these stories story not primarily
through legal briefs and court rulings but through the day-to-day lives of the
people affected: the black victims of the Colfax, La., insurrection whose racist
killers were set free by the Supreme Court in Cruikshank
(1876); the child laborers left unprotected by the Supreme Court in
Dagenhart (1918) and again in Adkins
(1923); the teenaged girl involuntarily sterilized with the Supreme Court’s
approval in Buck v. Bell (1927) opinion written by no less
a justice than Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.
The Lochner Era ended with the so-called Revolution of
1937 as one justice made a timely switch and President Franklin D. Roosevelt
replaced aged conservatives with pro-New Deal justices over the span of a few
years. FDR’s appointments helped usher in the mid-20th century
period of progressive judicial activism marked most dramatically by the 16-year
tenure of Chief Justice Earl Warren.
Millhiser opines that the Warren Court’s most important ruling,
Brown v. Board of Education (1954), could easily have gone
the other way. As one of his justices, FDR appointed the segregationist
congressman James F. Byrnes Jr. Byrnes resigned after barely a year to help FDR
with the domestic front in World War II; had he stayed, Millhiser suggests,
Byrnes would have stood firm for “separate but equal.” Millhiser also notes the
fortuitous death of the Kentucky-born chief justice Fred Vinson that brought
Warren to the court in fall 1953 just in time to tip the balance and eventually
to forge the unanimous ruling in Brown.
For Millhiser, the Warren Court’s decade-and-a-half of
progressive activism that followed is the blip, the historical exception. But
the Warren Court
legacy is truly a monumental achievement: revolutions in civil rights,
reapportionment, criminal justice, and free speech. Each was incomplete, as
Millhiser notes, but they are still largely intact. A president who
accomplished as much in the White House would be ranked among the historical
greats.
Millhiser marked the formal publication of his book with
an article on Think Progress Memo listing the five worst justices in history: Chief Justice Roger
Taney, of Dred Scott notoriety; Chief Justice Melville
Fuller and his contemporary Stephen Field, precursors of the Lochner Era; the
anti-Semite James McReynolds; and the present-day Clarence Thomas. The late
historian Nathan Miller engaged in the same exercise by listing the 10 worst
presidents in his book Star-Spangled Men in 1999. Despite
those stinkers, however, Miller did not give up on the presidency or its capacity
for political good.
In his indictment of the court, Millhiser gives it too
little credit, even in the worst of times and even with the present-day
misdirections of the Roberts Court. The Lochner Era brought the first stirrings
of court-mandated racial justice and laid the groundwork for the Due Process
Revolution that underlies privacy and reproductive rights. And the Roberts
Court has issued rights-expanding rulings in such areas as Guantánamo, prisons,
free speech, and gay rights even as it opened the door for corporate spending
in political campaigns and closed the courthouse door to injured consumers,
workers, and investors.
In any event, advocates litigate with the court we have,
not the one they might want. Millhiser rightly says the remedy for these ills
is better Supreme Court justices but the only specific step he suggests toward
that goal is a merit-based commission to vet Supreme Court nominees. Justice
has never flowed like water; it comes from hard work. All the more reason not
to give up too soon.
I see it a bit differently. We often react to court decisions based solely upon the outcome. For example, if the Court faithfully applies a bad statute and thereby produces a bad outcome, should we criticize the Court for producing the outcome or criticize the Congress/Legislature for writing a bad law? More generally, how much latitude should courts exercise when being asked to rewrite a law or to overturn established precedent in Constitutional interpretation? If they are too wiling to do whatever the judges subjectively think is "fair," it can erode the public's faith in the process itself. One could criticize BOTH the judges in the 50s and 60s, as well as those serving now, for doing just that, albeit in opposite directions. Dred Scott was a terrible outcome, but would we still have had a Civil War--and the abolition of slavery--regardless of the outcome? Likewise with Lochner: its terrible result may have spurred the rise of Organized Labor and better law for workers that eventually followed it. And some have suggested that Roe v. Wade triggered the religious right's reaction that has caused womens' right of choice to be imperiled and diminished in the years since. Rather than framing the issue as one of the "standard narrative" of the Court's "historic role of expanding and protecting legal rights of workers, minorities, and criminal defendants" being the exception, perhaps we should seek to understand and clarify the circumstances under which judges ought to go beyond their usual role of applying--rather than making--law.
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